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Grey Market Litigation in the United
States District Courts
Hugh j Turner, Jr. *
I. Introduction
A strong U.S. dollar and the recent trend of domestic manufac-
turers to move their manufacturing operations off-shore have made
the importations of "grey market goods" a major industry in the
United States.' Sometimes referred to as "parallel imports," 2 grey
market goods are authentic goods, intended for sale in foreign coun-
tries, that are diverted into, and sold in, the United States by persons
other than the authorized distributor. Through arbitrage the grey
market importer capitalizes on the cost difference between the au-
thorized goods and the diverted goods. This trade practice enables
U.S. consumers to purchase items at substantial discounts.3 Li-
censed domestic distributors complain that defective grey market
goods erode the product's goodwill because the grey goods are not
covered by the distributor's warranty. 4 In response, authorized dis-
tributors have fought in the courts and legislatures to ban grey mar-
ket goods.
This article analyzes the legal theories currently advanced by
manufacturers and authorized distributors5 in grey market litiga-
tion,6 focusing on procedural aspects of this litigation. Because the
factual circumstances and theoretical underpinnings differ widely
* Partner, Smathers & Thompson, Miami, Florida. B.S. 1967, Boston University;
J.D. 1975, University of Miami. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided
by David A. Doughty, an associate with the firm of Smathers & Thompson, in preparing
this article.
I The total value of the market in grey goods may be as much as $10 billion annu-
ally. Riley, "Gray Market" Fight Isn't Black and White, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
2 Counsel for grey market importers tend to prefer the term "parallel imports,"
while counsel for authorized distributors and manufacturers prefer the term "grey market
goods." The author will use the term "grey market goods" for purposes of uniformity.
3 See Are Those Cheap Camera Prices for Real?, Consumer Rep., May 1985, at 300; for an
economic analysis of grey marketing, see Nolan-Haley, The Competitive Process and Gray Afar-
ket Goods, 5 N.Y.L. SCn. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 231 (1984).
4 See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
5 Unless the context requires separate treatment, the term "authorized distributor"
will be used throughout this article to encompass both licensed or authorized distributors
and manufacturers.
6 Litigation in the International Trade Commission (ITC), aimed at intercepting
grey market goods at the customs border, is beyond the scope of this article. For a discus-
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from case to case, one body of law does not singularly address the
issue of grey market goods. Although the following theories have
been advanced by grey market litigants, the outcome of grey market
cases often depends largely upon the facts. To win a grey market
case, the practitioner should be especially sensitive to the facts of the
case, carefully presenting those facts that support his theory.
II. Trademark Infringement
Authorized distributors most frequently rely upon federal trade-
mark infringement law7 in their battle against grey market import-
ers. 8 While damages are available for infringement, 9 trademark
holders usually seek injunctive relief to terminate the influx of grey
market goods. Thus, the battle between the authorized distributor
and the grey market importer will be won or lost through the prelim-
inary injunction.
A. Preliminary Injunction
Unless the goods have been marketed by the grey market im-
porter for several months with the manufacturer's knowledge and
tacit agreement, the authorized distributor should immediately seek
to enjoin the grey marketeer from importing the goods.' 0 To obtain
a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show:
(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the
merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions concerning the merits to
ensure a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardship tipping
decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.',
While not dispositive, the public interest influences a court's deci-
sion of ITC litigation, see Victor, Preventing Importation of Products in Violation of Property
Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 783 (1984).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982). In addition, the plaintiff may bring an action
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, id. § 1125(a), based on unfair competition and an action
based on state and/or common law unfair competition. Ownership of a registered trade-
mark is not required in order to maintain a suit for unfair competition. See Exxon Corp. v.
Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 103 (5th Cir. 1983).
8 The term "grey market importers," as used throughout this article, will include
distributors and dealers in the United States who obtain grey market goods from grey
market importers for purpose of resale.
9 Damages available under the Lanham Act include (1) defendant's profits; (2) any
damages sustained by the plaintiff; and (3) the costs of the action. The court is also au-
thorized to enter a judgment in an amount three times the actual damages. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117 (1982).
10 In an appropriate case, a trademark owner may seek to obtain an exparte temporary
restraining order from the court. Although ex parte relief is now available in appropriate
counterfeiting cases (see In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979)), the extent to
which such relief is available in grey market cases is unclear. Grey market goods are ex-
pressly excluded from the definition of counterfeit marks found in the Trademark Coun-
terfeiting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116 (d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1986).
11 Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983); see
also Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979); Osawa,
589 F. Supp. at 1165.
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sion whether to issue a preliminary injunction.12
1. Irreparable Harm
Some courts have held that an inference of irreparable harm ex-
ists in the case of trademark infringement. 13 Irreparable harm is
more difficult to establish when a defendant can pay damages or
when the plaintiff alleges damage to an intangible such as reputa-
tion. 14 Courts are more likely to find, however, that damages are not
an adequate remedy when the quality of the infringing products is
inferior to the authorized products of the moving party.15
Other courts have held that a presumption of irreparable harm
exists in trademark infringement cases. If, however, the court does
not apply the presumption, the plaintiff should assert, if applicable,
that an adverse impact on the authorized distribution network has
occurred or that the product's goodwill or reputation has been in-
jured. For example, in Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo the trademark
owner alleged that grey market imports caused a demoralization of
the authorized distribution network, which caused a drastic decline
in sales:
Competition from grey marketers has caused demoralization, disaf-
fection and misunderstanding among authorized dealers, 40% of
whom have dropped the Mamiya line since 1980. There is evidence
that some dealers have misunderstood the cause of the problem, be-
lieving that plaintiff was granting preferred price treatment to their
competitors. 16
The court further noted that the plaintiff had laid off a large number
of its personnel, including a significant segment of the repair force,
and had suffered consequent delays in time needed for warranty
repairs. 17
Similarly, in Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp. 18 the plaintiff
claimed that grey market "Trivial Pursuit" games imported from
Canada generated dissatisfaction among licensed distributors who
were in consistently short supply but who could not import the game
from Canada. Selchow sought two forms of relief. The first was a
permanent injunction to keep the defendant from infringing its
12 See, e.g., Bill Blass, Ltd. v. SAZ Corp., 751 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1984); Le Beau v.
Spirito, 703 F.2d 639, 642 (1st Cir. 1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Conti-
nental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 1975).
13 See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1331
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); Paco Rabanne Parfums, S.A. v. Norco
Enter., Inc., 680 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1982); McNeil Laboratories, Inc. v. American
Home Prod. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 804, 809 (D.N.J. 1976).
14 See Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir. 1973).
15 See, e.g., American Diabetes Ass'n v. National Diabetes Ass'n, 533 F. Supp. 16, 21
(E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982).
16 Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1168.
17 Id.
18 612 F. Supp. 19, 23 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
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trademarks, copyrights, and patents. The second was money dam-
ages. The court granted the injunction, but ordered a trial on the
issue of damages. Therefore, in any case alleging an adverse impact
on a distribution network, the U.S. trademark owner should offer ev-
idence to prove the expense incurred in establishing the distribution
network.
Another type of irreparable harm caused by grey market goods
is a loss of mark promotion.' 9 Goods intended to be distributed in
the United States may contain advertisements of the domestic trade-
mark owner. Foreign copies diverted into the domestic market nor-
mally lack such advertisements, which reduces the domestic
trademark owner's advertising.20 Moreover, significant grey market
competition causes independent dealer dissatisfaction. This dissatis-
faction could significantly affect an advertising campaign which de-
pends in part on a cooperative advertising allowance to independent
distributors. 2'
2. Success on the Merits
Grey market importers affirmatively plead that no likelihood of
confusion between its products and those of the authorized domestic
distributor exists because the products share a common manufactur-
ing origin. To meet this contention, the authorized distributor must
emphasize that the modern view of trademark protection recognizes
that the reasons for the mark's protection extend beyond mere
source identification. The International Trade Commission recently
confirmed this view in In re Certain Alkaline Batteries:
We are, however, aware of the number of divergent cases holding
that imports of foreign trademarketed goods do not infringe U.S.
trademarks where there is no confusion. These decisions are based
on the theory that the only function of trademark law is to prevent
consumer confusion.
We do not believe that this is the only purpose of trademark law. A
trademark has several functions including: (1) to enable buyers to
identify one seller's goods and distinguish them from goods sold by
others; (2) to signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from
a single, albeit, anonymous source; (3) to signify that all goods bear-
ing the trademark are of an equal level of quality; and (4) to assist
the seller in the advertising and selling of his goods. A trademark is
also the objective symbol of the goodwill built up by the trademark
owner. A function of the trademark law is to protect a trademark
owner's investment in goodwill because it is considered unfair to al-
low one to appropriate goodwill and profits which a competitor has
built up by quality and advertising in a trade symbol. When a trade-
mark symbolizes a trade or business, the trademark owner has the
1,) See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1168.
20 See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Uniglobe Int'l, Inc., No. 84-1767 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec.
6, 1985).
21 See Selchow, 612 F. Supp. at 24.
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exclusive right to use the mark on the goods of the same description
of his manufacture or sponsorship.... [A United States trademark]
does not just protect consumers from likelihood of confusion, but it
also protects the trademark owner's goodwill and the benefits that
are derived from that goodwill, including profits.
22
To establish a probability of success on the merits, a plaintiff
need only show that a likelihood of customer confusion, rather than
actual confusion, exists. 23 Toward this end, an authorized distribu-
tor should show as many differences as possible between his goods
and services and the grey goods and services, or the absence of serv-
ices, sold on the grey market.
The discrepancy between the authorized distributor's goods and
the grey goods is seen best in warranty service provided by the au-
thorized distributor. Usually, authorized distributors go to great
length to provide warranty service for their products. In contrast,
grey market importers rarely provide any warranty service. Focusing
on this difference, the court in Bell & Howell.- Mamiya Co. v. Masel
Supply Co. 24 granted a preliminary injunction:
It is plaintiff that defines the warranty and provides the repair serv-
ices for the cameras it sells. The cameras defendant sells lack that
warranty.... [P]laintiff's warranty and assurances of quality are sig-
nified by the MAMIYA marks in this country. Defendant's use of
those marks carries with it none of these assurances.
2 5
The Second Circuit, however, vacated the injunction, ruling that the
grey goods' lack of warranty did not amount to irreparable injury.
The court reasoned that the distributor could alert the consumer of
whether the camera carried warranties by labels, advertisements, or
other things.2 6 Without reaching the merits, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that less drastic means than an injunction were available to
avoid the likelihood of confusion.
Other courts, however, have found that substantial differences
in warranty and post-sale service may contribute to the likelihood of
confusion. For example, in Osawa 2 7 and in Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc.
v. Dash28 the courts rejected the grey market importers' claims that
they would provide warranty service. Osawa stated that the grey mar-
ket importers' warranties would not be effective, which would aggra-
vate the likelihood of confusion:
[T]he warranty is of value to the goodwill of the mark only if offered
by one who has the incentive to uphold the reputation of the
22 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823, 829-30 (1984), exclsion order disapproved by President Rea-
gan, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 862 (1985).
2 See Selchow, 612 F. Supp. at 24.
24 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1983).
25 id. at 1079.
26 Bell, 719 F.2d at 46.
27 589 F. Supp. 1163.
28 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985).
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mark.... [The trademark owner] would have no assurances that the
[grey market importers'] warranty repairs would be properly per-
formed or that the obligation would be graciously accepted. [The
trademark owner] would be constantly subject to the risk that [the
grey market importers] would disavow the obligation or perform in-
adequate repairs. Disparities between plaintiff's and defendants'
performance of warranty work would further confuse the market-
place as to the standing and meaning of the Mamiya mark.2 9
Furthermore, the plaintiff in Osawa successfully showed that it main-
tained a vast inventory of accessory equipment to satisfy promptly
the needs of its professional clientele.3 0 Plaintiff contended, and the
court agreed, that the inventory was a cost incurred exclusively by
the authorized distributor, which further distinguished the author-
ized distributor's goods from the grey market importer's goods.
In Weil Ceramics the grey market importers argued that plaintiff's
warranty to replace defective goods was similar to their obligations
to purchasers of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code.3 1 The
court rejected this claim noting that consumers rely on authorized
distributors-not grey market importers-to maintain the quality of
the product.3 2 The court adopted Osawa's reasoning and concluded
that the disparity between warranty service would compound the
confusion.
The dubious quality of the goods sold by grey market importers
may damage the goodwill established by a trademark owner. In John-
son &Johnson Products, Inc. v. DAL International Trading Co. 3 3 Johnson
&Johnson contended that there would be customer dissatisfaction if
their toothbrushes, intended for sale abroad without the American
Dental Association seal of acceptance, were diverted to the United
States. In Selchow the exclusive licensee, distributor, and domestic
manufacturer of "Trivial Pursuit" brought suit to enjoin defendant
from importing Canadian versions of the game. The defendant also
imported "Sexual Trivia" games. Selchow, a manufacturer of family
games, alleged that the importer's importation and sale of "Sexual
Trivia" games injured Selchow's reputation. Noting that domestic
consumers associated Selchow's reputation with "Trivial Pursuit,"
the court concluded that Selchow demonstrated that a substantial
likelihood of confusion existed, which proved Selchow's case for stat-
29 589 F. Supp. at 1169.
30 Id. at 1167.
31 618 F. Supp. at 714.
32 Id. New York now requires stores selling grey market goods to post disclosures if
they are selling brand-name merchandise not covered by the manufacturer's standard U.S.
warranty. See N.Y. Assembly Bill No. 5971, effective October 22, 1985; see also Taylor, N. Y.
To Start Gray Market Warnings, Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1985, at E3, col. 1.
33 No. 85-3966 (D.N.J. filed August 22, 1985) (order granting preliminary injunction)
on appeal sub nom. Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc. v. Quality King Mfg., Inc., No. 85-5629
(3d Cir. filed Jan. 28, 1985). For a full discussion of Johnson &Johnson, see infra notes 81-
93 and accompanying text.
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utory trademark infringement.3 4
Packaging differences also may cause confusion, which damages
a product's goodwill. In Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Unigloble Interna-
tional Inc. 3 5 packaging of products destined for the domestic market
was designed to appeal specifically to the tastes of the U.S. con-
sumer. Foreign packaging, which utilized different color schemes
and included instructional material in foreign languages, caused con-
fusion when sold in the United States.3 6
An authorized distributor's quality control further distinguishes
those products imported through the domestic mark holder from
those imported on the grey market. In Weil Ceramics3 7 the authorized
distributor inspected all porcelain pieces and most of the other
larger pieces that it received. The authorized distributor submitted
the remaining smaller pieces to a shake test to determine breakage.
While the authorized distributor visually inspected only four to five
percent of the porcelain pieces, the court found this inspection to be
sufficient evidence of the licensed distributor's separate goodwill.
Similarly, in Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho International, Inc.38 the
court stated that the licensed distributor maintained quality control
by keeping an inventory of parts for the model automobile kits that it
distributed. The court affirmed the preliminary injunction, noting
that the licensed distributor's employees opened and inspected each
kit and replaced broken or missing parts before distribution.3 9
3. Balance of Hardships
If the grey market importer's only hardship will be lost profits
and plaintiff's losses are substantial, the court will usually grant a
preliminary injunction. For example, in Osawa 40 the defendants
dealt in various types of photographic equipment, and realized sig-
nificant profits from the sale of grey goods. The court found that an
injunction would not seriously affect the grey marketeers' overall
business. 41 On the other hand, the plaintiff already had sustained
large losses that threatened to undermine its entire business. Ac-
cordingly, the court granted plaintiff preliminary relief.4 2
In Johnson &Johnson the court stated that no countervailing equi-
ties existed for the grey market distributor because the defendant
"operates in a commercial environment in which it is a trade practice
34 612 F. Supp. at 24.
35 Nintendo, No. 84-1767.
36 See Bell, 548 F. Supp. at 1069.
37 618 F. Supp. at 711.
38 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502 (1983).
39 Id. at 503.
40 589 F. Supp. at 1170.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1179.
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to close one's eyes to defects in title or other factors which would
subject a transaction to nullification. Those who operate in such a
manner must accept the consequences of self-imposed blindness." 43
In contrast, the court in El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World,
Inc. ,44 held that the balance of hardships would not lie in favor of the
trademark owner if, by exercising sufficient control over its foreign
manufacturers, the mark owner could prevent any future unauthor-
ized disposition of its trademarked goods. The court stated that the
plaintiff may have had an adequate legal remedy for any contract
damage it could prove, which obviated the need for a preliminary
injunction.45
B. Affirmative Defenses
1. Antitrust Claims
If a plaintiff has violated antitrust laws, he may be estopped from
enforcing his trademark rights. A grey market importer may allege a
relationship in restraint of trade as an affirmative defense and coun-
terclaim in a trademark infringement action.46 The gravamen of an
antitrust claim is that the licensed distributor would have an unjusti-
fied monopoly on the domestic sale of the goods. The Osawa court
dismissed the grey market importers' antitrust claim, holding that
the enforcement of the licensed distributor's rights in the United
States would not bar defendant from selling the same equipment in
Japan.47 The court noted that the defendant may compete in the
United States if the infringing trademark were removed, as specified
in the Genuine Goods Exclusion Act. 48
In Selchow 49 the court upheld the grant of an exclusive license
under a patent to the United States. Selchow noted that 35 U.S.C.
§ 261 expressly authorizes the assignment of an exclusive right
under a patent to the whole or any part of the United States. After
referring to cases interpreting the statute, Selchow held that such an
assignment is not an illegal territorial restriction.
2. Acquiescence Claims
A licensed trademark holder may be estopped from seeking in-
junctive relief if his protest to the importation of grey market goods
43 No. 85-3966 at 27 (order granting preliminary injunction).
44 599 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
45 Id. at 1401.
46 Litigation regarding the antitrust issues raised in a grey market case is beyond the
scope of this article. For a discussion of the antitrust law in this area, see supra note 6.
47 589 F. Supp. at 1178.
48 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 526, 464 Stat. 741 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526
(1982)).
49 612 F. Supp. at 27.
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is untimely. In Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service50 the
court found that the grey market importers relied upon the trade-
mark holder's apparent acquiescence to the grey market importation
of fragrance products.5 1 The court noted that an injunction would
cause the grey market importers to default on delivery orders neces-
sary to place goods on the shelves during one of the most significant
selling seasons of the year. Accordingly, the court held that possible
injury to the grey market importers would be far greater than to the
trademark holder.
3. Exhaustion Doctrine
The exhaustion doctrine prohibits a trademark holder from con-
trolling branded goods after releasing them into the stream of com-
merce. The trademark holder's control is deemed exhausted after
the first sale of the goods. After the mark holder exhausts his con-
trol, secondary dealers may advertise and sell the merchandise in
competition with the mark holder as long as they do not represent
themselves as authorized agents.
The exhaustion defense may not apply, however, if the author-
ized domestic distributor has developed goodwill separate from that
of the mark originator. In Osawa the authorized U.S. distributor de-
veloped separate goodwill through significant warranty service, pro-
motional rebates, educational activities, and product adver-
tisement. 52 The court found that the authorized distributor had not
exhausted its rights to the goods in the domestic market.53 Thus, to
prevail against the exhaustion defense the authorized distributor
must distinguish itself from the foreign mark holder and prove that
an independent goodwill exists.
C. Investigation and Discovery
1. The United States Distributor
Typically, the domestic distributor and the foreign mark owner
have devoted substantial time, energy, and money to create a U.S.
market. Often, the authorized distributor feels that the grey market
importer gets a free ride on the goodwill developed by the distribu-
tor. The grey marketeer profits unfairly, if not illegally, from the au-
thorized distributor's investment.
Grey goods have wreaked havoc among the authorized distribu-
tors' marketing and quality control infrastructure. Increased compe-
tition from grey market goods demoralizes dealers, which erodes the
authorized distributor's network of distribution. Likewise, as the
50 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
51 Id. at 420.
52 589 F. Supp. at 1174.
53 Id.
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grey market importer gains a buyer share of the market, the domestic
distributor's sales decrease. Once sales decline, jobs are lost.
To advance a legal theory which affords relief from grey market
imports, the authorized distributor must marshal those facts that
permit a suit to be maintained successfully. A plaintiff should ex-
amine the authorized distributor's contribution in developing the
product which has been introduced on the grey market. A complete
internal investigation should be conducted to establish those facts
that distinguish the authorized distributor from the foreign mark
owner. All elements that demonstrate independent goodwill from
the foreign mark owner should be established. The following inquir-
ies should be made:
(1) Do customers associate the product with the authorized distrib-
utor or the foreign mark owner?
(2) How much money has the authorized distributor spent to ad-
vertise and promote the product and to establish the product
distribution network?
(3) Does the authorized distributor furnish a warranty, service, ac-
cessories or rebates?
(4) Does the authorized distributor attend trade shows and market
the product in the United States?
(5) Does the authorized distributor provide quality control before
the product reaches the consumer or does it simply act as a
middleman between the foreign manufacturer and the U.S.
consumer?
(6) How long have the grey market goods been entering the coun-
try? How long has the authorized distributor and foreign mark
owner known about the importation?
(7) Has the foreign mark owner made any attempt to terminate dis-
tribution of the goods to the grey market by the mark owner's
foreign manufacturer(s)?
In addition, the authorized distributor should determine if con-
sumer confusion exists by making the following inquiries:
(1) Has the authorized distributor received warranty claims on
grey market goods?
(2) Based upon the authorized distributor's own pre-suit investiga-
tion, what differences exist between the authorized distribu-
tor's goods and those of the grey market importer?
A consumer survey can be invaluable in documenting consumers'
confusion.
Courts will usually expedite discovery so that it can be taken
within the truncated period available before the preliminary injunc-
tion hearing. The authorized distributor should consider discovery
and investigation (perhaps with the assistance of a private investiga-
tor) concerning the following areas:
(1) The manner in which the grey market goods are shipped to
the United States.
(2) The identities of all suppliers who have furnished the grey
market importer with the grey goods.
[VOL. I I
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(3) The identities of all customers who have purchased or ob-
tained the grey goods.
(4) Any correspondence, including complaints, received by the
grey market importer concerning the grey goods.
(5) How the grey market importer first learned of the grey goods.
(6) Advertising or promotion of the grey goods, if any, by the
grey market importer.
(7) Any warranties provided by the grey market importer in con-
nection with the grey goods.
(8) All information about the handling of the grey goods (includ-
ing repackaging and storage) following receipt by the grey
market importer.
(9) The extent to which the grey marketeer services the grey
goods.
(10) The identity of all importers, freight forwarders, and customs
brokers who handle the grey goods.
(11) Any disclosures that are made by the grey market importer to
customers that the grey goods are not warranted by the au-
thorized distributor.
(12) The depth of the grey market importer's line of inventory in
the grey goods.
(13) Any customer profiles done by the grey market importer to
ascertain who is purchasing the grey goods.
(14) A complete analysis of the grey market importer's business
(present and past), including the percentage of present busi-
ness that grey goods represent.
2. The Grey Market Importer
The grey market importers stress the competitive advantages
and cost savings that the market of "parallel imports" affords con-
sumers. These importers often characterize the product's distribu-
tion network as noncompetitive, if not monopolistic. Frequently,
grey market importers attempt to persuade the court to apply a nar-
row definition of trademark protection, which focuses upon the ori-
gin of the grey market goods.
The grey market importer should show that the authorized dis-
tributor has no separate identity from the foreign mark owner and
no independent goodwill in connection with the product. Investiga-
tion and discovery by the grey market importer should explore the
following areas:
(1) The validity of the trademark.
(2) A detailed examination of the global marketing and distribu-
tion network of the authorized goods, including the relation-
ship between the domestic authorized distributor and the
foreign mark owner.
(3) Does the authorized distributor provide a warranty with its
goods? If so, how often are claims presented? How many ser-
vice claims has the authorized distributor received for the
goods? How much money, if any, has the authorized distribu-
tor spent to provide repair services for the grey market goods?
(4) A detailed examination of every contact the authorized distrib-
1986] 359
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utor has with the goods (e.g., inspection, servicing), including a
review of the authorized distributor's books and records. The
grey market importer should determine each additional cost in-
crease attributable to value added by the distributor.
(5) A detailed examination of all possible bases that the authorized
distributor claims create confusion and that allegedly establish
the authorized distributors' independent goodwill.
(6) A detailed examination of all claims of irreparable harm result-
ing from competition from the grey goods.
(7) Ascertainment of specific customer complaints lodged with the
authorized distributor through the use of interrogatories.
(8) A detailed examination of the domestic distribution network
and the quality control and other features which the authorized
distributor claims are compromised by importation and sale of
the grey goods.
(9) An investigation of the degree of control the foreign mark
owner exercises over its foreign manufacturer(s) to eliminate
sale at the source of the grey market goods.
D. Summary Judgment
The authorized distributor should consider a motion for sum-
mary judgment if it appears that no genuine issue of material fact
exists. The motion's outcome depends on the grey market im-
porter's ability to establish whether there is any genuine issue of fact
about the existence of separate and independent goodwill. In Weil
Ceramics the court held, as a matter of law, that the authorized do-
mestic distributor had developed independent goodwill. The court
relied on the distributor's careful inspection of the products, war-
ranty on the merchandise, and promotion of the products. 54 The
court stated that the licensed distributor had established independ-
ent goodwill in the United States for the trademark and that the grey
market importer's use of the mark was likely to cause confusion.
Therefore, the court found that no genuine issue of material fact ex-
isted and granted the authorized distributor's motion for summary
judgment. 55
Similarly, the Selchow court granted summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff-manufacturer.5 6 The court in Selchow held that the
defendants failed to establish that the authorized distributor was
merely a fragment of a single international enterprise. On this basis,
Selchow distinguished Parfums Stern, and held that the authorized dis-
tributor's domestic goodwill deserved protection. 57
III. Copyright Infringement
Because some courts have been unwilling to grant injunctive re-
54 618 F. Supp. at 713.
55 Id. at 718.
56 612 F. Supp. at 29.
57 Id.
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lief for trademark infringement, an authorized distributor should
also assert a claim for copyright infringement. 58 A copyright is gen-
erally defined as an intangible property right given to creators of cer-
tain kinds of artistic or intellectual property. Generally, a copyright
claim may be asserted if the copyright holder has the exclusive right
to sell the goods in the United States. The holder's rights last fifty
years after the creator's death or, in some cases, seventy-five years
from publication or one hundred years from creation. While the
copyright need not be registered to own the rights to that copyright,
registration is a condition precedent to initiating suit.
A. Preliminary Injunction
As in trademark infringement actions, the most effective device
to halt the flow of grey goods is a preliminary injunction. An injunc-
tion is even more effective if the alleged infringer has paid the sup-
plier and cannot recover its money. The criteria for issuing a
preliminary injunction in a copyright case are the same as those used
in a trademark infringement action.59
Loss of control over the copyrighted work and loss of "advertis-
ing clout" 60 may cause customer dissatisfaction and irreparable in-
jury.6 1 Conversely, a copyright owner's receipt of profits from the
sale of the goods abroad militates against a finding of irreparable
injury.62
The balance of hardships are usually in the copyright owner's
favor,63 with at least one court stating that the defendant's lost profit
"merits little equitable consideration."' Some courts have held that
the grey market benefits the public because the grey market importer
can offer consumers the same goods as the authorized distributor,
but at a lower price.65 In contrast, other courts have held that the
Copyright Act promotes the public interest in creativity by providing
an economic reward for creative expression. 66 If the injunction is
denied, then the intent of the Act would be frustrated.
B. Impoundment of Goods and Documents
A plaintiff may request the impoundment of defendant's goods.
Under the Copyright Act, 67 the court has discretion whether to im-
58 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982).
59 See supra notes 10-43 and accompanying text.
60 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
61 See Selchow, 612 F. Supp. at 23.
62 See Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enters., Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344, 348 (S.D. Fla.
1985).
63 See WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enters., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 132, 138 (D.D.C. 1984).
64 See Helene Curtis, 560 F.2d at 1333.
65 See Cosmair, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 348; Parfums Stern, 575 F. Supp. at 420.
66 See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
67 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982).
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pound the goods.68 The standard of proof required for impound-
ment varies, but at least one court has applied the criteria for issuing
a preliminary injunction. 69
To meet this standard, the plaintiff must present complete infor-
mation regarding the location, identity, and number of targeted
products. Prior to the impoundment hearing, the plaintiff should
obtain authorization from a surety company for a bond and should
contact the U.S. Marshal's office to arrange for moving trucks and
personnel. Because grey market goods generally appear identical to
authorized goods, the plaintiff should petition the court for a field
expert to accompany the Marshal during the impoundment to iden-
tify the goods subject to seizure.
In addition, the plaintiff may move to impound relevant docu-
ments in the defendant's possession. Document impoundment is au-
thorized under the All Writs Act, 70 which provides that the courts
may issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respec-
tive jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law."' 71 Document impoundment can prove invaluable to the plain-
tiff. Through impoundment, a variety of documents often come to
light-ones that might not otherwise surface in a request for produc-
tion. A seal order should be obtained from the court to prevent the
defendants from gaining advance knowledge of the documents
sought.72
C. Affirmative Defenses
In grey market copyright litigation, a defendant may assert a lim-
ited number of meritorious defenses.
1. First Sale Doctrine
Under the first sale doctrine, the buyer of legally-made copy-
righted goods does not need the copyright owner's consent to sell to
a secondary purchaser. 73 In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Scorpio
Music Distributors, Inc. 74 the grey market importer argued that it was
not a proper defendant because it did not directly import the goods
from abroad. Rather, it transacted its business within the United
States with an intermediary corporation. The court rejected this de-
fense finding that the defendant had ordered the records from the
intermediary with full knowledge of the importation problem. 75 The
68 See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70, 72 (1st Cir. 1981).
69 See WPOW, 584 F. Supp. at 134.
70 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Crystal Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980).
73 See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
74 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
75 Id. at 48.
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court noted that the plaintiff need not proceed against the intermedi-
ary corporation because a copyright holder may proceed against any
member in the distribution chain. 76
2. Innocence of the Infringer
While not an actual defense to copyright infringement, inno-
cence may reduce the amount of statutory damages, if damages are
sought. Under the Copyright Act, the court has discretion to award
damages for each work infringed within the statutory range of $250
to $10,000. 77 Regardless of the number of infringements, the court
makes only one statutory damage award for each work infringed.
The $10,000 ceiling may be lowered to $100 in cases of innocent
infringement.78
IV. Fraud
In New York and New Jersey, 79 grey market importers have
been sued for fraud. The authorized distributors sought to rescind
sales by grey market wholesalers abroad and sought to award the
seller-manufacturer possession of the goods. The plaintiff, Johnson
& Johnson Products, Inc., alleged that a buyer, who acquired grey
market goods by fraud, took only voidable title to the goods. Thus,
the defrauded seller-manufacturer had superior title and a right to
recover possession of the goods from anyone participating in the
fraud. Johnson & Johnson maintained that it was entitled to recover
possession of the goods from a subsequent purchaser who obtained
the goods with knowledge of the fraud, or under circumstances that
should have placed the purchaser on notice that its supplier might
not have good title to the goods.
A. Preliminary Injunction
The critical determination in a grey market action based on
fraud is the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction. 80 InJohn-
son &Johnson Products, Inc. v. DAL International Trading Co. 81 the plain-
tiff claimed that DAL International Trading Company, a Polish state-
76 Id.
77 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1982).
78 Id. § 504(c)(2).
79 The New York case, Johnson & Johnson, Ltd. v. Allou Distributors, Inc., No. 85-
3233 (E.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 7, 1985), is presently in the discovery stage. Johnson &Johnson
has alleged that the grey market distributor is a third-party tortious converter of the goods
that were obtained by fraud. No injunction was sought since the goods had already been
distributed to retailers and were no longer in the distributor's possession. Johnson &
Johnson, however, was successful in obtaining an injunction in DAL Int'l, No. 85-3966,
which is currently on appeal.
80 The criteria for a preliminary injunction is the same as in an action brought under
trademark or copyright infringement law.
81 No. 85-3966, slip op. at 2 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1985).
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owned trading agency, ordered large quantities of Johnson & John-
son "Reach" toothbrushes and baby products. An export manager,
who negotiated the transaction, testified that Johnson & Johnson in-
tended the goods be used only in Poland-not resold for distribution
in the United States.82
Johnson & Johnson contended that the goods destined for the
Polish market were not identical to those destined for domestic dis-
tribution. For example, the plaintiff's baby products designated for
domestic distribution were packaged with tamper-resistant "Quality
Seals." These "Quality Seals" were part of Johnson & Johnson's ef-
forts to restore the confidence of U.S. consumers after tampered
Tylenol surfaced in the U.S. market in 1982. Johnson & Johnson
claimed that similar precautions were not required for goods to be
distributed abroad. 83
In addition, Johnson & Johnson alleged that its baby products
were formulated to appeal to consumer tastes in foreign markets,
which differed from the domestic market. Plaintiff further claimed
that marketing and sales costs were much lower in Poland, which
permitted plaintiff to sell its products in the Polish market at less
than the wholesale price. The price reduction was justified, however,
only if the products would not be resold in markets where Johnson &
Johnson had substantial marketing and sales costs. 8
4
Next, plaintiff set forth the steps that the defendants allegedly
went through to perpetrate the fraud. The Polish buyer sought the
approval and registration of the goods with regulatory authorities in
Poland, which was required if the goods were to be used in that
country, to foster the impression that the buyer intended the goods
for Polish consumption.8 5 The goods were loaded onto the Polish
buyer's trucks in West Germany and shipped through East Germany
to the Polish border. At the border, the trucks turned around and
proceeded to Belgium, where the goods were loaded onto vessels
bound for New Jersey. Then the goods were shipped to the grey
market wholesaler's warehouse in New York, where the manufac-
turer's production code numbers were stripped off the cartons.
Finding that Johnson & Johnson would likely prevail on the is-
sue of fraud, the court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction. 86 The court held that the grey market distributor could
not claim to be a good faith purchaser; therefore, because the grey
market importer had closed its eyes to circumstances surrounding
82 See Brief for Appellees at 5, Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc. v. Quality King Mfg.,
Inc., No. 85-5629 (3rd Cir. filed Jan. 28, 1985).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 6.
85 Id. at 7.
86 DAL Int'l, No. 85-3966.
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the transaction that "cried out for inquiry,"'87 the grey market im-
porter only acquired voidable title. These circumstances included:
(1) the low price of the goods, (2) the stripped production codes, and
(3) the grey market distributor's unfamiliarity with the grey market
wholesaler.88
The court also found that the grey market goods would harm
Johnson & Johnson's sales and *distributor relations. This damage
would be impossible to evaluate with "any degree of accuracy."
Moreover, plaintiff would also lose its statutory right to rescission.8 9
In the court's view, the public interest in discouraging fraudulent
conduct outweighed any consumer interest in purchasing Johnson &
Johnson products at low prices. 90
B. Affirmative Defenses
Because Johnson &Johnson represents the first attempt by a man-
ufacturer to stop the influx of grey market goods through an action
based on fraud, the availability of affirmative defenses in this area is
undetermined. However, certain defenses, if proven, may apply to
such a claim. These defenses are claims of a good faith purchaser for
value and an overriding public interest.
1. Good Faith Purchaser Status
To qualify as a good faith purchaser for value under section 2-
403(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a merchant must show
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing in the trade.91
The Johnson &Johnson court found that the circumstances of the
transaction "cried out for inquiry" as to the origin of the goods. The
court stated that the defendant failed to make such an inquiry and
had deliberately insulated itself from the truth. This behavior, the
court noted, does not confer the status of bona fide purchaser. 92
2. Public Interest Considerations
The court further found that public interest considerations
would not preclude injunctive relief. The court observed that "an
injunction will prevent the public from buying genuine, quality prod-
ucts at lower prices, but on the other hand, in the long run the public
will surely benefit from implementation of a rule of law which dis-
87 Id. at 24.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 26.
90 Id. at 27.
91 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1977).
92 DAL Int'l, No. 85-3966 at 24.
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courages fraudulent conduct." 93
V. Racketeering
Although no grey market case has been decided on racketeering
grounds, some courts have indicated that the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)94 may provide a basis for ob-
taining injunctive relief and civil damages. RICO 95 makes it unlawful
for any person associated with an enterprise affecting interstate com-
merce to conduct the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. 96
An instructive case in this area is Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Congo
Agencies, Inc.,97 in which the court held that Fieldcrest Mills stated a
cause of action under RICO. 98 Fieldcrest, the manufacturer of
"Royal Velvet" towels, alleged that Congo Agencies induced Field-
crest to sell over $650,000 worth of Royal Velvet towels to Congo at
a discounted price. Congo's executive officer represented that the
towels would be sold in Central and West Africa. According to its
complaint, Fieldcrest desired to expand its foreign market; thus it
was willing to sell the towels at prices substantially below those of-
fered to direct domestic retail customers. Instead, the towels were
allegedly sold at a substantial discount at defendant's domestic retail
outlets in the United States. According to Fieldcrest, Congo never
intended to export the Royal Velvet towels. Defendants allegedly
devised a scheme in which Congo could purchase the towels at the
reduced rate for foreign markets, then sell them in the United States.
Fieldcrest sought permanent injunctive relief as well as monetary
damages. 99
The district court broadly interpreted RICO and denied defend-
ant's motion to dismiss the RICO counts. The court stated that the
statute did not require a distinct "racketeering injury" as a prerequi-
site to recovery.' 00
The court also rejected the defendants' claim that a RICO civil
action required a prior criminal conviction for the underlying predi-
cate act.' 0 ' The court held that Fieldcrest adequately alleged the
existence of an "enterprise" as required in section 1962(c) by claim-
ing that the U.S. distributor was an active participant and direct ben-
eficiary of the scheme to defraud Fieldcrest. 10 2 The court also
93 Id. at 27.
94 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
95 Similar state RICO statutes have been enacted in over 24 states.
96 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
97 No. 85-305 (D.N.J. filed April 8, 1985) (order denying motion to dismiss).
98 The Fieldcrest case is currently in the discovery stage of litigation.
99 Fieldcrest, No. 85-305 at 3.
100 Id. at 7.
101 Id. at 10.
102 Id. at 11.
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found that Fieldcrest adequately alleged that the defendants con-
spired to assist in the enterprise's corrupt activities. I03
Because no case has been decided on RICO grounds, the effec-
tiveness of a civil RICO claim cannot be determined. 10 4 Plaintiffs
have alleged racketeering violations in other grey market cases, but
the cases were usually decided on trademark infringement
grounds. 105 If applicable to the facts of the case, affirmative defenses
and counterclaims based on antitrust law may constitute valid de-
fenses in a RICO action. 10 6
VI. Dilution
Anti-dilution statutes protect not only commercial goodwill, but
also the selling power a distinctive mark engenders in the consuming
public's mind. 10 7 Over twenty states provide a statutory remedy for
trademark dilution.' 0 8 The elements of the parties' competition and
confusion about the product's origin, are not needed for recovery.10 9
Anti-dilution statutes provide a cause of action distinct from other
state law actions for trademark infringement and unfair competition.
The parties' competition and consumer confusion are not elements
of the claim; thus a plaintiff need not prove them to recover." t0
Under pendent jurisdiction, plaintiffs may assert various state claims
in grey market cases that are litigated in federal courts.
In Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc. I ' the court considered a
cause of action based on an anti-dilution statute. The court affirmed
the lower court's refusal to grant injunctive relief because the plain-
tiff failed to "set forth some proof that its marks conjure up images
of its clothing in the minds of the consuming public in order to es-
tablish associational qualities entitling it to protection from dilu-
tion."' "12 The record did not contain any evidence that the use of
defendants' "Sally Lee" name on expensive women's clothing would
103 Id. at 16.
104 A criminal RICO claim was alleged in United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522
(1 th Cir. 1985), in which the court found sufficient fraudulent acts committed by a grey
market pharmaceutical enterprise to support conviction of the participants under the fed-
eral RICO Act.
105 For example, the plaintiff in Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1163, alleged a RICO claim,
but the court held for the plaintiff on trademark infringement grounds.
106 For a discussion of antitrust defenses, see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying
text.
107 Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity
Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289 (1984).
108 See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205
n.8 (2d Cir. 1979).
109 Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 544,
399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 369 N.E.2d 1162 (1977).
I 10 See Note, Trademark-368-d Dilution Relief in New York-Abandoning the Confu-
sion/Competition Requirement, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1323 (1978).
111 699 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1983).
112 Id. at 626.
1986]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
likely blur plaintiff's "Sally Gee" product identification in low-cost,
ready-to-wear items. The court declined to determine whether the
"Sally Gee" mark was sufficiently distinct to warrant protection
under the anti-dilution statute because Sally Gee could not prove any
damage to its reputation by Sally Lee's handmade, higher-priced,
and higher quality clothing." 13
In El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc. 14 New York's
anti-dilution statute was specifically held inapplicable. El Greco cited
Sally Gee"1 5 stating that the concept of dilution is nebulous and usu-
ally characterized as a "whittling down" of the identity or reputation
of a trade name. While the plaintiff's trademark was distinctive, the
court noted the plaintiff offered no proof of dilution caused by the
defendant's acts." 6 To prevail on a dilution theory, a plaintiff must
show that he has suffered a distinct "dilution" injury which tarnishes
its reputation.
VII. Conclusion
Because no single body of law governs all grey market cases,
grey market litigation draws upon related doctrines for analytical
theories to be applied. Litigants should allege as many alternative
theories as possible, consistent with the facts of each case. They
should keep in mind, however, that a grey market case will generally
be decided on the basis of its facts, with success usually being
achieved by the party best able to present facts in support of its the-
ory of the case.
113 Id. at 625-26.
"14 599 F. Supp. 1380.
115 699 F.2d 621.
116 El Greco, 599 F. Supp. at 1395.
[VOL. I I
